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Notes
DO DOCTORS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VIOLATE
THEIR PATIENTS' PRIVACY?.: OHIO'S PHYSICIAN
DISCLOSURE TORT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Physicians today are encountering an unprecedented level of public
expectation that responsibility for preventing disclosures of intimate patient medical information rests with them.1 Nevertheless, the American
public's attempts to constrain health care providers' disclosure of their
2
private medical information have been only minimally effective. Both
state and federal courts have struggled for decades to fashion an appropri3
ate remedy for a breach of physician-patient confidentiality. Unfortunately, as the legal basis of a disclosure-related tort focuses on preventing
the undesired communicative conduct of the physician, the tort becomes
subject to constitutional challenge as a state action that encroaches on a
4
physician's First Amendment rights.
1. See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (fashioning direct civil remedy. for patients against health care providers for unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical records); Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918 (proposed Nov.
3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160) (imposing wide array of regulations
on health care providers of all types, requiring implementation of programs and
procedures to restrict access to health records and account for disclosures); see also
Bartley L. Barefoot, Enacting a Health Information Confidentiality Law: Can Congress
Beat the Deadline?,77 N.C. L. Iiv. 283, 306 nn.183 & 185 (1998) (listing numerous
groups calling for federal legislation to protect patient confidentiality); Lawrence
0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. Rv. 451, 454 (1995) (reporting that, in health care reform, eighty-five percent of public considers protecting
confidentiality of medical records more essential than providing universal coverage, reducing paperwork or improving research); Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection
of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 295, 296 (1995) (citing reports
that three-fourths of public believes that "individual has lost control" of how private information is circulated).
2. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 310 (explaining that unsatisfactory protection
for private medical information results from lack of uniformity in legislation across
states and federal government as well as less than comprehensive coverage within
existing laws). Injuries to patients resulting from disclosure of their private medical information are serious. See id. (discussing reports stating that threats and
harms from disclosures are neither trivial nor imaginary).
3. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 522-23 ("Since [1917] courts in Ohio and elsewhere have faced common metamorphic disturbances in attempting to provide a
legal identity for an actionable breach of patient confidentiality.").
4. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for
Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 84 (1995) (concluding that same characteristic of breach of confidence tort that makes it appropriate for plaintiff recovery-its
focus on speech as source of harm-also subjects it to First Amendment challenge).

(141)
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Although physicians have been bound to confidentiality by ethics
codes since the dawn of the medical profession, they have largely escaped
accountability for violations of confidentiality beyond mere professional
sanctions. 5 In recent decades, the proliferation of complex health care
delivery systems has broadened disclosure of medical records far beyond
that necessary for treatment and has greatly increased the risk of breaching patient confidences. 6 Commentators have remarked that medical
records privacy, given the complexity of today's health care delivery infrastructure, is severely undermined. 7 Neither state nor federal laws protecting patients' privacy in government-held medical records reach the
5. See Bernard Friedland, Physician-PatientConfidentiality: Time to Re-Examine a
Venerable Concept in Light of Contemporary Society and Advances in Medicine, 15 J. LEGAL
MED. 249, 255 (1994) (discussing roots of ethics in medical profession). The medical profession developed and applied its own ethical framework from its inception
over 2500 years ago. See id. at 255 n.33 (quoting medical journal articles on professional ethics). The Hippocratic Oath, originating around 400 B.C., states: "What I
may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep
to myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about." Id. at 256. Despite
professional admonitions to keep patient confidences, physicians were not subject
to civil liability for unauthorized disclosures until 1917. See id. at 252 (citing Smith
v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917), as first case in United States to permit civil
action against physician for unauthorized medical records disclosure).
6. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 485-86 (listing authorized users of patient
records as including those who "provide, manage, review, or reimburse patient
care services; conduct clinical or health services research; educate health care professionals or patients; develop or regulate health care technologies; accredit health
care professionals or provider institutions; and make health care policy decisions"); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 314 (discussing use of private medical information for purposes beyond that necessary when collected, including examples of
companies marketing lists of elderly incontinent women, allergy sufferers, people
with bleeding gums and people with epilepsy).
When life insurance companies request medical records for policy approval,
they may share that information with other companies. See How Private Is My Medical Information, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/
fs8-med.htm (last modified Aug. 31, 2000) (describing role of Medical Information
Bureau, Inc.). Medical Information Bureau, Inc. is a medical insurance reporting
agency, similar to a credit reporting agency, which provides 750 member life insurance companies coded medical information on 15,000,000 individuals. See id.
(describing scope of company operation). Medical information reported by the
company includes weight, blood pressure and electrocardiogram results. See Consumer Information, Medical Information Bureau, Inc., at http://www.mib.com/consumer/about-general.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2000) (explaining scope of
reported medical data). The company also reports non-medical information, including an individual's adverse driving record and their participation in hazardous
sports. See id. (explaining scope of reported non-medical data).
7. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 512-13 (arguing that today's electronic health
care system can no longer rely on provider-patient confidentiality to protect
records-rather, protection must be attached to record itself instead of associated
with particular institutions which happen to have possession); Karen Timmons,
When It Comes to MedicalPrivacy, Your File Could Be an Open Book, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1990, at A35, A38 ("Anything you tell anybody in a hospital is available to anybody
who is interested enough to go and get it ....
The patients [have] become a
database.").
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majority of medical records that exist in the private sector.8 State laws that
do reach private sector records usually protect only extra sensitive categories of medical data. 9 Legislation protecting general medical records privacy has been adopted by too few states. 10
Patients seeking redress for disclosure of intimate facts regarding
their medical treatment can turn to tort remedies.1 1 Physicians often assert the affirmative defense of justified disclosure, which is continually
8. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (protecting only medical records held by federal government agencies). Although the Privacy Act protects federally held health records from disclosure without authorization by the
patients whom the records describe, exceptions are provided for "routine uses" of
health records. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 501 (discussing frequent release of
federally held medical records to researchers with identification of patients in record intact); see also N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 96 (McKinney 1991) (protecting stateheld medical records).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to
informational privacy. See Richard C. Turkington, Medical Record Confidentiality
Law, Scientific Research, and Data Collection in the Information Age, 25 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 113, 115 (1997) (noting constitutional rights to privacy in both personal
decision-making and private information). This constitutional right to privacy
only protects persons from access by the government and its agencies and does not
apply to access by parties in the private sector. See id. (describing limitations of
constitutional privacy protections).
9. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 508 (discussing variety of state laws prohibiting
disclosure without patient consent of health records that indicate "mental illness,
HIV infection or AIDS, and sexually transmitted diseases," as well as special protec-

tions of records containing genetic information). Protections for sensitive health
problems can be undermined, however, by exceptions in state laws. See id.
(describing provision in Connecticut statute that permits H1V status disclosure to
so many individuals, it essentially "swallow[s] the privacy rule").

10. See UNIF.

HEALTH-CARE INFO.

ACT § 8-103, 9 (Part IB) U.L.A. 183, 230-31

(1999) (providing for civil cause of action for unauthorized disclosures of medical
information). The Act in relevant part states:
§ 8-103. Civil Remedies.
(a) A person aggrieved by a violation of this [Act] may maintain an
action for relief as provided in this section.
(b) The court may order the health-care provider or other person to
comply with this [Act] and may order any other appropriate relief.
(e) If the court determines that there is a violation of this [Act], the
aggrieved person is entitled to recover damages for pecuniary losses sustained as a result of the violation; and, in addition, if the violation results
from willful or grossly negligent conduct, the aggrieved person may recover not in excess of [$5,000], exclusive of any pecuniary loss.
Id. (alteration in original). The civil remedy provision of the Act has been adopted
by only Washington and Montana, who have respectively set the statute of limitations for bringing suit at two and three years. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-501
(1987) (same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.02.005 (West 1991) (adopting provision); see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (requiring
patient authorization for disclosure of medical records except for purpose of
health services payment).
11. For a complete discussion of tort remedies available to patients distressed
by unauthorized disclosure of their private medical information, see infranotes 3466 and accompanying text.
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strengthened by the increase in laws that compel or permit physician disclosure of patient medical records in service of public policy. 12 When the
disclosure is not justified, traditional theories underlying medical records
disclosure actions have proven largely inappropriate for circumscribing
the egregious conduct of health care providers or compensating patients
13
for actual harm.
One development in medical privacy protection shows promise in reversing the trend of diminished public control over medical records disclosure. 14 The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Biddle v. Warren General
Hospital,15 upheld, on an independent basis, a patient's right to sue her
health care provider for disclosing medical records to a third party without
authorization. 16 The decision in Biddle makes Ohio the first state to abandon traditional bases of disclosure liability by creating an independent tort
for the unauthorized disclosure to a third party of private patient medical
data. 17 As a specific and narrowly tailored remedy, this new tort has the
potential to directly address the wrong of disclosure, while either avoiding
or surviving a First Amendment challenge. 18
12. For examples of when a physician is legally justified to disclose private
patient medical information, see infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

13. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 490 (describing harms incurred by patients
whose medical confidentiality has been breached). As a result of medical records
disclosure, patients can experience both intrinsic harms, such as mere fact of unwanted disclosure and insults to dignity, and extrinsic harms, such as economic
losses and stigmatization causing embarrassment and lowered self-esteem. See id.
(outlining range of harms incurred by disclosures).
14. For a brief discussion of recent developments in health records control,
see infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. For a broader discussion of the development regarding creation of an independent physician disclosure tort, see infta notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
15. 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999).
16. See generally id. (establishing independent tort for unauthorized physician
disclosure of confidential patient data and abandoning inadequate traditional theories of recovery). For a full discussion of Biddle, see infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
17. See AlexanderJ. Brittin et al., UnderstandingHHS's ProposedHealth Information Privacy Standard, H.C.P.R., Dec. 6, 1999, at § VIII (emphasizing Biddle case as
example of how state law may provide answer to problem of gap in HIPAA regulations for patient private right of action).
18. See generally Gilles, supra note 4, at 65-84 (discussing likely survival of
breach of confidence actions grounded in contract or fiduciary trust doctrine
under First Amendment, but arguing that even most limited formulation of independent breach of confidence tort is still too general, and therefore implicates too
much speech to survive strict First Amendment scrutiny). But see G. Michael Harvey, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
2385, 2449-69 (1992) (arguing that because interests protected by breach of confidence are narrower than interests protected by invasion of privacy, tort can surmount constitutional obstacles). Free speech challenges to a state-defined tort are
brought via the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies the protections of the First

Amendment to the several states. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985)

(discussing application of First Amendment protections to states before and after
passage of Fourteenth Amendment). For a complete discussion of the viability of
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This Note discusses the need for an appropriately fashioned civil remedy against physicians for unauthorized medical records disclosures and
whether such a remedy would be constitutional under the First Amendment. Part II discusses how courts balance patient privacy and public policy, and the problems patients face when they attempt to use traditional
theories of recovery for unauthorized disclosures. 19 Part III discusses
Ohio's struggle to find an appropriate patient remedy and the emergence
of a new and independent tort in Biddle.20 Part IV examines the viability
21
of Ohio's new tort under First Amendment doctrine.

II.

THE NEED FOR AN APPROPRIATE TORT TO REMEDY BREACH
OF PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

A.

BalancingPublic Policy and PatientPrivacy

Judicial recognition of patients' interests in confidentiality, as well as
the responsibility of physicians to maintain confidentiality, is well established.22 Courts have stated that the need to provide patients with a safe
environment where they can divulge their most intimate bodily information is paramount to their acquisition of adequate health care. 23 Courts
also recognize that respect for patients' privacy must be balanced against
the tort created in Biddle under the First Amendment, see infra notes 112-73 and
accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the balance struck between public policy and patient
privacy, see infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of Ohio's application of traditional tort theories and its
creation of an independent tort, see infra notes 68-111 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the new Ohio tort in light of First Amendment jurisprudence, see infra notes 112-73 and accompanying text.
22. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (distinguishing physician-patient relationship from reporter-source relationship at issue in case as one which serves society's interest when it creates zone of
privacy, based on "strong assurances of confidentiality," which individual communicating sensitive information can control); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
243 F. Supp. 793, 801-02 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("We are of the opinion that the preservation of the patient's privacy is no mere ethical duty upon the part of the doctor; there is a legal duty as well.").
23. See, e.g., Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 797 ("To foster the best interest of the
patient and to insure a climate most favorable to a complete recovery ...
medicine [has] urged that patients be totally frank in their discussions with their
physicians."); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962) ("A patient should
be entitled to freely disclose his symptoms and condition to his doctor in order to
receive proper treatment without fear that those facts may become public property. Only thus can the purpose of the relationship be fulfilled."); Berger v. Sonneland, 1 P.3d 1187, 1192-93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) ("[P]hysicians cannot administer
effective treatment if patients avoid treatment or withhold information based on a
fear that their physician might disclose information obtained as part of the treatment .... ."); see also Gostin, supra note 1, at 490-91 (noting that unless patients can
be assured that their confidences will be kept, their reluctance to share sensitive
information may result in inadequate medical treatment).
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the public's need for both protection against community hazards and a
24
prudent administration of justice.
For public policy reasons, courts find legal justification for a physician's disclosure of a patient's medical condition to government authorities or third parties under certain circumstances. 2 5 For example,
physicians are generally immune from liability if they breach confidentiality to report a violent crime to the police, a public health hazard to disease
control centers, or evidence of child abuse to family services.2 6 In addition, rules of civil procedure permit physicians to disclose the results of
27
patients' exams when their medical conditions are at issue in litigation.
Despite these exceptions, patients expect that their physicians are
their confidants, and patients are generally appalled to learn of any
breach of their confidences, whether legally justified or not. 28 Pursuant to

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") of
1996, the United States Department of Health and Human Services has
promulgated regulations requiring all health care organizations to adopt
24. See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 524 (Ohio 1999)
(noting that physician is immune from liability for disclosure when statutory or
common law duty mandates disclosure). Concerns for public safety, the safety of a
third person or even the health of the patient can outweigh the patient's interest
in confidentiality. See id. (describing scope of physician's immunity). See generally
Barefoot, supra note 1, at 326-51 (examining recent debates regarding level of protection to be afforded health records in light of necessary goals of treatment and
payment, research, preservation of public health, health care quality oversight, law
enforcement and employer self-insurance).
25. See, e.g., Howe v. United States, 887 F.2d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 1989) (permitting disclosure of Air Force intelligence officer's drug abuse to superiors to protect
military security); Hague, 181 A.2d at 349 (finding no liability for disclosure of
infant patient's heart condition to insurer upon application by parents for life insurance on child); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832-33 (Neb. 1920) (finding no liability in physician disclosure of patient's syphilis condition on reasonable
belief that disease was contagious and disclosure was necessary to prevent spread to
others); see also Turkington, supra note 8, at 114-15 (describing breadth of physician disclosures mandated by state statutes, including evidence of "communicable
disease, elder abuse, domestic violence, injuries caused by deadly weapons, abortions, and birth defects").
26. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524 (describing conditions permitting physician
disclosure without liability for breach of patient confidentiality).
27. See FED. R. Cfv. P. 35(a) (permitting discovery of plaintiff's medical
records when plaintiff's condition is central to litigated issue). The term "privilege" is used in discussions of tort law as a concept that immunizes physicians from
liability for disclosure. See, e.g., Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524 (discussing physician privilege to disclose for public policy reasons). Injudicial proceedings, privilege refers
to the right of the client/patient to prevent disclosure of attorney-client or physician-patient communications absent a waiver. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (permitting discovery of information so long as not privileged). When referring to
liability-free disclosure by a physician, this Note uses the term "legal justification"
instead of privilege to avoid confusion.
28. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 312 (discussing use by employers of employees' health care data to oppose claims for worker's compensation, to increase insurance premiums for employees with unhealthy habits and to discourage suits by
employees about to be fired, despite employee belief in confidentiality).
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procedures to protect the confidentiality of patient medical records. 29
These regulations impose wide restrictions on access to patient records
and require health care institutions to promptly account for disclosures
30
upon patient request.
Although HIPAA regulations focus health care providers' attention
31
on protecting patient privacy, the regulations are only prophylactic.
Remedies for patients injured by disclosures resulting from regulatory violations are not provided, so patients remain dependent on common law
32
methods of recovery.
Courts frequently find express or implied duties of physicians to protect their patients' confidences, and they permit causes of action by pa33
tients against their physicians or hospitals to proceed.

29. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
64 Fed. Reg. 59,918 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160)
(imposing wide array of regulations on health care providers of all types, requiring
implementation of programs and procedures to restrict access to health records
and account for disclosures). HIPAA authorized the Department of Health and
Human Services to promulgate regulations if Congress failed to pass legislation
protecting health records privacy by August 21, 1999. See Pub. L. No. 104-191
§ 264, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (setting legislation deadline); Turkington, supra note
8, at 122 (describing timetable for promulgation of regulations).
30. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
64 Fed. Reg. at 59,922-27 (summarizing effect and purpose of regulations). A general principle underlying the regulations is replacing the need to obtain individual
patient authorization for disclosure with a clearly delineated scope of users to
whom access is restricted. See id. at 59,924 (explaining that regulatory intent is to
create "sphere of privacy").
31. See id. at 59,923 (stating authors' concern that regulations do not provide
private right of action for patients harmed by violations). The regulations, however, do provide criminal penalties for especially wrongful disclosures, such as disclosures for monetary gain. See id. at 59,926 (summarizing criminal sanctions).
The regulations also permit the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") to impose civil fines on health care providers for failure
to comply with the rules. See id. (noting cap of $25,000 per year per provision
violated). As a further remedial measure for individuals harmed, the regulations
call for a complaint system to be created within health care provider organizations
and the HHS itself. See id. (noting intent to promote voluntary compliance by
providers). The only direct recourse against physicians required by the regulations
are provider-determined sanctions, which can range from a warning to termination. See id. at 60,035 (summarizing sanction requirements).
32. See id. at 59,923 (noting absence of private right of action for individuals
harmed).
33. See, e.g.,
Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (finding that relationship between physician and patient is contract
containing implied covenant of confidentiality); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446
N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that psychiatrist's duty of confidentiality "sprang" from relationship itself, which is "one of trust").
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Problems Recovering for Breach of Patient Confidentiality Under
Traditional Tort Theories

Patients sufficiently distressed by a disclosure of their private medical
information and seeking justice through a common law cause of action
encounter a number of difficulties. 34 Legal theories upon which patients
traditionally have brought suit include invasion of privacy, negligence/
malpractice, implied breach of contract, breach of fiduciary trust and in35
Assuming no letentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
a patient must
liability,
from
a
physician
immunizes
gal justification
successfully establish a prima facie case and win a judgment that fits the
injury incurred.3 6 Traditional legal actions typically frustrate patients in
applied
one or both of these areas.37 An examination of four commonly
38
face.
patients
problems
the
highlight
will
theories of recovery
Actions for invasion of privacy are brought under the "private facts"
9
branch of this heterogeneous tort.3 Plaintiffs are required to show that
the defendant publicized private information about the plaintiff that
34. See generally Gilles, supra note 4 (examining inadequacies of invasion of
privacy, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary relationship theories of recovery for breaches of confidential relationships); Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence:
An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1437-48 (1982) (same).
35. For a discussion of the adequacy of these theories for claims alleging unauthorized physician disclosure, see infra notes 36-66 and accompanying text.
36. See generally Gilles, supra note 4, at 4-53 (describing requirements for
bringing common law claims and what types of damages are recoverable).
37. See generally id. (examining reasons why recoveries afforded by common
law actions generally do not fit harm of unauthorized breach of confidential

relationship).
38. For a discussion of the application of these tort theories, see infra notes
39-66 and accompanying text.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (defining branch of
invasion of privacy tort where "Publicity [Is] Given to Private Life"). The Restatement defines the four branches of the invasion of privacy tort as follows:
§ 652B Intrusion Upon Seclusion
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
§ 652C Appropriation of Name or Likeness
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
§ 652D Publicity Given to Private Life
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
§ 652E Publicity Placing Person in False Light
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would highly offend the reasonable person and is not of legitimate public
concern. 40 Additionally, the information publicized cannot have already
been made public. 41 Medical records are arguably private information,
the publicity of which certainly would offend most patients. 42 The publicity requirement of this tort, however, limits its application to those cases
where the information is widely disseminated. 43 A physician's disclosure
of a patient's medical condition to an individual or small group would
44
therefore not meet the plaintiffs prima facie burden.
When patients sue their physicians for malpractice, they sue under
theories of battery, negligence in performing a procedure to which the
45
patient has consented, or negligence in obtaining informed consent.
Because medical records disclosure does not involve any physical touching
of a patient's body, and the premise of the wrong is that the patient did
not consent to the disclosure, malpractice actions based on battery or negOne who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed.
Id. at §§ 652B-E.
The tort of invasion of privacy originated with an article by United States Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, written in response to the media's coverage of his friend's daughter's wedding. SeeJohn A. Jurata, Jr., Comment, The Tort
That Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of PrivateFacts, 36
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 489, 492-93 (1999) (discussing origins of invasion of privacy

tort). Justice Brandeis argued that the emotional distress resulting from a disclosure of private matters is at least as injurious as a physical injury. See Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HLv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890)
(discussing press intrusion into private affairs as then contemporary problem).

40. See

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS

§ 652D (listing requirements for

cause of action).
41. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (holding that

publicizing of rape victim's name already in court documents open to public inspection will not sustain prima facie case for invasion of privacy).
42. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 453 (underscoring "high value" placed by society on "protection of the private sphere from governmental or other intrusion").
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. a (explaining that satisfying "publicity" requirement of tort requires dissemination of information to

large audience, not just single person or small group). The Restatement comment

suggests that instruments of mass communication, such as newspapers and television stations, are the likely vehicles through which an invasion of privacy claim will
manifest. See id. (describing situations where tort is applicable).
44. See id. at cmt. h (describing prima facie burden for "private facts" claim).
But seeJurata,supra note 39, at 510-13, 525-29 (noting recent judicial willingness to
uphold private facts actions against non-media defendants for more limited disclosures of especially sensitive private information).
45. See, e.g., Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966) (discussing adequacy

of patient's claim against doctor for paralysis resulting from spinal cord surgery
under three major theories of medical malpractice recovery).
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ligence in performing a procedure, respectively, are inapplicable. 46 The
remaining malpractice theory, lack of informed consent, applies directly
to the wrong of unauthorized physician disclosure. 47 Most courts limit

recovery under this theory, however, to physical injuries resulting from the
manifestation of a risk of which the patient was unaware. 48 A patient who
is able to present a prima facie case will not be compensated solely for
mental distress resulting from a physician's disclosure when that distress is
49
unaccompanied by physical injury.
Some courts have upheld disclosure claims on the theory that a contract exists between a physician and patient, and that the contract includes
an implied covenant of confidentiality. 50 This significantly eases a patient's prima facie burden, because the physician-patient interaction evi51
dences the contract, and the unauthorized disclosure proves the breach.
Most contract remedies, however, focus on injuries related to the contract
breach and are inadequate to address a patient's disclosure-induced distress. 52 Contract damages must be calculable with reasonable certainty,
leaving unearned income from a revelation-related job loss as the only
compensable harm. 53 Generally, emotional distress is not recoverable in
46. See id. at 666-71 (describing elements of tort theories plaintiff must prove
to sustain cause of action).
47. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (defining physician disclosure without patient consent as basis of tortious
conduct).
48. See Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 864 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (adopting
general rule that patient can only recover for "injur[ies] proximately resulting

from the treatment"). But see Fairfax Hosp. v. Curtis, 492 S.E.2d 642, 647 (Va.
1997) (waiving general rule requiring physical injury to recover for emotional distress in malpractice action against hospital for prematurely releasing medical
records in connection with separate litigation initiated by plaintiff). The Virginia
Supreme Court stated that when a separate cause of action exists distinct from
causing emotional distress, physical injury is not required for recovery. See id. (creating exception to general rule).
49. See Miller, 522 P.2d at 864 (requiring physical injury to recover).
50. See, e.g., Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 (finding implied condition of contract between physician and patient that private information obtained during treatment would not be revealed without patient's consent).
51. See Anderson v. Strong Mem'l Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (Sup. Ct.
1988) ("[T]he physician-patient relationship itself gives rise to an implied covenant of confidence and trust which is actionable when breached.").
52. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 25-32 (examining applicability of recovery theories under contract law to injuries resulting from breach of confidence). One reason why breach of confidence plaintiffs generally do not recover high awards is
that contract law does not seek to punish a defendant for breaching an agreement.
See id. at 27 n.117 (describing purpose of contract law as to compensate injured
party for economic expectation contemplated in the contract). A patient's injuries
from an unauthorized physician disclosure can include loss of income, loss of reputation and mental distress. See id. at 25 (noting typical injuries resulting from
disclosure).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) (requiring reasonable certainty in calculation of loss to be recovered). Hadley v. Baxendale estab-

lished the rule requiring the claimed injury to be foreseeable to the parties as
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contract actions unless special circumstances exist and are spelled out be54
forehand in the contract.
Courts have also recognized causes of action for a physician's disclo55
sure premised on a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty to a patient.
Courts reach this position by analogizing the physician-patient relationship to other relationships that carry fiduciary obligations and by grounding the implied duty in public policy and the ethics codes of the medical
profession. 56 Analogous to implied contract theory problems, patient
remedies focus on restoration of the "trust" breached or return of the benefit received by the fiduciary. 57 Except where a physician's disclosure results in a calculable benefit, liability is avoided for a patient's mental
58
distress over the breach.
In addition to these theories, actions for unauthorized medical
records disclosure have been based on intentional or negligent infliction
resulting from a contract breach. See 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854) (establishing
injury foreseeability rule). Plaintiffs who show that a job loss was a foreseeable
consequence of a physician's disclosure may be able to recover lost income. See
Gilles, supranote 4, at 27-30 (outlining special circumstances under which contract
plaintiff can recover special damages). Contract relief does encompass injunctive
remedies, which plaintiffs can pursue to protect themselves from future breaches if
the disclosures are planned or ongoing. See id. at 31 n.131 (noting willingness of
courts to award equitable relief to prevent repeated breaches).
54. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 27-28 (noting rare circumstances in which
breach of confidence plaintiff can recover special damages under contract theory
as result of Baxendale requirement).
55. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (Ala. 1974) (finding that
confidential relationship existed between physician and patient giving rise to duty
not to disclose without patient's consent); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349
(NJ. 1962) (same).
56. See, e.g., Home, 287 So. 2d at 828 ("[M]embers of a profession, especially
the medical profession, stand in a confidential or fiduciary capacity as to their
patients." (quoting Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962))).
A formal fiduciary duty is recognized only in particular relationships: beneficiarytrustee, guardian-ward, agent-principal, attorney-client, director-shareholder and
partnership. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 40 (noting legally recognized legal fiduciary relationships). Beyond formal fiduciary relationships, "confidential relationships," such as doctor-patient and priest-parishioner, have been recognized as
carrying a duty to maintain confidentiality. See id. at 41& n.172 (discussing confidential relationship characteristics as including "great intimacy, disclosure of
secrets, entrusting of power, and superiority of position").
57. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508-16 (1980) (holding that

former CIA employee who published book was in violation of fiduciary duty of
confidence to his employer, creating constructive trust to hold profits from book
sales); Gilles, supra note 4, at 48-51 (describing available remedies to plaintiff as

injunctive, as in contract law, and return of economic benefit received by fiduciary
as result of breach).
58. See Kohler v. Fletcher, 442 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that plaintiff can only seek equitable remedy for breach of fiduciary duty

(restoration of trust), and that recovery for emotional damages is prohibited); see
also RESTATEMENT
remedies).

(SECOND)

OF TRUSTS

§ 197 (1959) (permitting only equitable
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of emotional distress and fraudulent misrepresentation. 59 Patients have
encountered comparable difficulties applying these theories. 60 Courts
faced with unauthorized medical records disclosure claims have unanimously declared a breach of the physician's duty of confidentiality "so palpable a wrong" that it deserves a remedy. 61 Nevertheless, courts have been
largely unsuccessful in finding an appropriate remedy to compensate for
the harm incurred and to precisely define the wrongful conduct they wish
62
to deter.
A few courts have flirted with upholding physician liability on a
breach of confidence theory, which correctly compensates for the distress
incurred by the disclosure. 63 Proposed formulations grounded indepen59. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 4 n.15 (noting plaintiff's attempts to bring
claims on theories of intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress, viola-

tion of civil rights, fraudulent misrepresentation and appropriation of property).
See generallyJessica Litman, Information Privacy/InformationProperty, 52 STAN. L. REv.
1283 (2000) (arguing that tort model is superior to property model for protection
of personal information).
60. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 4 n.15 (noting failure of novel claims).
61. See Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572, 572 (Wash. 1917) (holding for first time
in United States that unauthorized extra-judicial disclosure of patient records is
actionable, regardless of label given claim). The plaintiff in Driscoll brought a
claim for slander against his physician for revealing confidential information on
the witness stand. See id. The claim was dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action because the plaintiff failed to allege facts that the physician's statements in
court were irrelevant to the proceedings. See id. at 573-74. The court did not dismiss the action because it might have been improperly designated as slander. See
id. at 572. Instead, the court stated:
[I]t is wholly immaterial by what name the action is called. Neither is it
necessary to pursue at length the inquiry of whether a cause of action lies
in favor of a patient against a physician for wrongfully divulging confidential communications. For the purposes of what we shall say it will be assumed that, for so palpable a wrong, the law provides a remedy.
Id. Driscollhas since been quoted by many courts as a precursor to recognizing a
patient cause of action against a physician for an unauthorized disclosure of private information. See, e.g.,
Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (quoting key language in Driscoll); Alberts v. Devine, 479
N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) (same); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801,
802-03 (App. Div. 1982) (same); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(same); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ohio 1999) (same);
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 684 P.2d 581, 587 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)
(same); Berger v. Sonneland, 1 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (same).
62. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 522-23 (remarking that courts' attempts to create
viable remedy for patient injuries from disclosure have "stretch [ed] ...traditional
theories beyond their reasonable bounds, or ignore[d] or circumvent[ed] otherwise sound doctrinal limitations").
63. See, e.g., Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (recognizing breach of confidence cause
of action against psychiatrist while grounding tort in contract and fiduciary concepts). Among the states, New York and California are closest to establishing an
independent breach of confidence tort. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 53-56 (arguing
that two states recognizing breach of confidence as distinct cause of action have
done so in limited fashion). The Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld a breach
of confidence action on the theory that a private right of action was implied by the
state's statute conferring a duty on physicians to maintain their patients' confiden-
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dently in breach of confidence vary according to which relationships are
subject to confidential expectations. 6 4 The various theories attach liability
in exclusively nonpersonal relationships where a reasonable person would
expect a confidence to be kept, in any recognized fiduciary relationship
that carries an implied obligation of confidentiality, and when the parties
have voluntarily agreed to maintain a confidence. 65 Scholars disagree on
whether even the most limited breach of confidence tort can survive a
First Amendment challenge because the tort by nature is a generalized
remedy infringing on too broad a category of speech. 66
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PHYsIciAN DISCLOsuRE TORT
IN OHIO

A.

Ohio's Attempts to Remedy Patient Harmsfrom Unauthorized
Medical Records Disclosures

Ohio's experience in attempting to provide patients a remedy for unauthorized disclosures of confidential medical information is representative of the difficulty encountered in other states. 67 An aggregate of
statutory provisions and medical ethics codes delineates the scope of a
physician's legally justified disclosure of patient information without consent, but fails to define the basis upon which a physician can be held liable
for an unjustified disclosure. 68 Courts interpreting Ohio law have applied
common law tort remedies to unauthorized disclosure actions, but have
69
done so inconsistently as to legal theory.
tiality. See Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1974) (finding breach of
confidence action in statutory violation).

64. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 2 n.1 1 (listing scholars proposing various formulations of breach of confidence tort).
65. See Harvey, supranote 18, at 2426-36 (proposing breach of confidence tort
encompassing any voluntary and explicit agreement between parties that information exchanged will be kept confidential); Vickery, supra note 34, at 1456-68 (proposing broad and narrow formulations of breach of confidence tort,
recommending intermediate formulation requiring existence of nonpersonal confidential relationship).
66. Compare Harvey, supra note 18, at 2469-70 (arguing that proposed breach
of confidence tort will meet. United States Supreme Court First Amendment requirements), with Gilles, supra note 4, at 80-84 (arguing that breach of confidence
torts are too broad and chill too much speech to survive First Amendment
scrutiny).
67. See Craig E. Johnston, Breach of Medical Confidence in Ohio, 19 AKRON L.
REv. 373, 375-78 (1986) (describing cases decided in New York, Michigan, Utah
and Nebraska where, similar to Ohio, courts have tried to reconcile breach of con-

fidence action with traditional recovery theories).
68. See id. at 383 (arguing that patient rights of action are "implied" by two

Ohio statutes governing medical records disclosure that explicitly immunize physicians for disclosure to cancer registries and hospital utilization committees).
69. For a comparison of remedies applied by Ohio courts, see infra notes 7087 and accompanying text.
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Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 70 was the watershed medical

records disclosure case in Ohio. 7 1 In Hammonds, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio upheld a patient's cause of action
against his insurance company, which had induced the patient's physician
to discuss his medical condition on the premise that the patient was contemplating a lawsuit. 72 Finding no legal justification for a physician to
disclose for merely contemplated litigation, the court found support for a
patient cause of action in the medical profession's own ethics codes and a
trend in other jurisdictions towards upholding claims for unauthorized
medical records disclosure. 73 The Hammonds court relied upon both the
implied contract and the fiduciary duty theories to hold that the patient's
74
action could proceed.
Two subsequent cases decided by Ohio state appellate courts upheld
a patient's right to sue a physician for unauthorized disclosure. 75 In Prince
v. St. Francis-St. George Hospitals, Inc.,7 6 the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed

a summary judgment against the patient, finding a genuine issue of fact as
to whether a "publication" of the patient's private facts occurred to establish a prima facie case of invasion of privacy. 77 The patient's doctor sent
her medical bill, prominently stating her diagnosis as "Acute & Chronic
Alcoholism Detoxification," to her husband's employer.7 8 The court rejected the physician's argument that only intentional invasions of privacy
70. 243 F. Supp 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
71. SeeJohnston, supra note 67, at 378 (noting that Hammonds was first case in
Ohio to uphold cause of action for unauthorized medical records disclosure).
72. See Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 795 (stating facts). The patient's insurance
company engaged in an unsupervised discussion with his doctor, exceeding the
supervised testimonial access they would have had if the patient had waived his
right to confidentiality by bringing a malpractice claim. See id. at 805 (noting that
patient waiver does not permit "private conference" between plaintiffs physician
and defendant's lawyer).
73. See id. at 801-03 (establishing support for new cause of action). The court
also echoed the proposition that "a physician ... wrongfully divulging confidential
communications . . . [is] so palpable a wrong, the law provides a remedy." Id. at
801 (quoting Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572, 573 (Wash. 1917)).
74. See id. (finding implied covenant of confidentiality when doctor treats patient, as well as fiduciary obligation of trust in treatment relationship).
75. See generally Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 484 N.E.2d 265
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (upholding patient cause of action against physician for unauthorized disclosure); Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985) (same). In Hobbs v. Lopez, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld a patient's
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress for a nurse's notification,
under doctor's orders, to a patient's parents that she sought advice concerning an
abortion. See Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261, 1263-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that nurse's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to sustain claim under tort
requirements).
76. 484 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
77. See id. at 267-68 (stating that facts show letter sent to patient's husband's
employer was open and read).
78. See id. at 267. The records were also labeled with the phrase "Restricted
Code-Not to Publish." See id.
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should be actionable and expanded the tort's boundary to include negligence. 79 Although the court's holding on invasion of privacy grounds differed from the Hammonds decision on contract and fiduciary theories, the
court's opinion was not clear as to whether the cause of action lay in the
"private facts" or "intrusion" categories of the tort.8 0 The court's discussion of the publicity requirement of the private facts category further confused the outcome because it intimated that mere communication to a
third party, as opposed to wide dissemination, would be sufficient for liability to attach. 8 '
The Ohio Court of Appeals was similarly unclear as to the application
of invasion of privacy to medical records disclosure in Levias v. United Airlines.8 2 In Levias, a flight attendant sought a waiver from her "appearance
supervisor" of the airline's weight requirement on medical grounds and
directed her personal physician to disclose her records to the airline's
medical examiner. 83 The medical examiner, without the patient's consent, disclosed her medical condition to her supervisor.8 4 As in Prince, the
Ohio Court of Appeals in Levias was unclear as to which category of the
privacy tort was being applied to affirm the patient's compensatory award
and as to the meaning of publicity in the private facts category.8 5 The
court noted in its opinion that a physician's legally justified disclosure extends to those with "a real need to know," and concluded that the patient's
supervisor only required a waiver recommendation from the medical examiner, not the medical details of her condition.8 6 The court did not

79. See id. at 268-69 (stating that Ohio precedent did not limit actions for
invasion of privacy to only intentional conduct).
80. See id. (referring to "intrusion" branch of tort in discussion of its application to negligent as opposed to intentional conduct).
81. See id. at 267-69 (reversing summary judgment against patient on grounds
that publication to one person may constitute publicity under invasion of privacy
claim). The court assumed in its opinion that the publicity requirement of the
invasion of privacy tort would be satisfied by communication to a single individual,
contrary to the Restatement's specification that publication to a large audience is
necessary to sustain a claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. a
(1977) (explaining publicity as dissemination to wide audience).
82. 500 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
83. See id. at 373-74. The patient in Levias suffered from an iron deficiency
anemia for which her doctor suggested not to diet and to take an oral contraceptive which caused her to retain fluids. See id. at 373.
84. See id. at 373 (noting flight attendant's belief, based on past practices and
union contract with airline, that medical examiner was subject to same duty of
confidentiality as her own physician).
85. See id. at 375-76 (quoting plaintiff's complaint alleging both publication of
private information and intrusion into private affairs, but upholding compensatory
damages overall without reference to particular branch of tort).
86. See id. at 374 (replacing jury charge of "legitimate interest in the patient's
health" with broader "real need to know, not mere curiosity" requirement for legally justified physician disclosure).
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qualify the need to know requirement as necessarily being treatment
87
related.
B.

Ohio's Independent Physician Disclosure Tort

Biddle was the first case in which the Ohio Supreme Court addressed
whether a patient in that state has a private right of action against a health
care provider for a breach of medical confidentiality. 88 In Biddle, a hospital agreed to its attorneys' suggested review of its patient registration forms
for the purpose of identifying patients as candidates for supplemental security income to satisfy unpaid medical expenses. 8 9 The hospital disclosed
the registration forms to the law firm without obtaining any consent from
the patients, nor having screened or sorted the forms in any manner. 90
Throughout a two and one-half year period, the attorneys and their staff
reviewed approximately 12,000 registration forms, each containing the patient's name, age, medical condition and telephone number. 9 1 During
the review period, the law firm contacted approximately 100 hospital patients, and subsequently met with five patients regarding representation
92
for benefits application.
The Biddle patients brought a class action suit against the hospital and
the law firm, alleging invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. 9 3 The trial court granted summary judg87. See id. at 375 (rejecting proposition that plaintiffs supervisor had "real
need to know" because she lacked capacity to act on data).
88. See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ohio 1999) (citing

lower state court cases and federal cases interpreting Ohio law which have upheld
patients' right to sue for unauthorized disclosure of medical records).
89. See id. at 520 (describing agreement between hospital and law firm that
attorneys would receive contingency fee upon payment from federal program).
90. See id. at 520 (stating that hospital made no effort to identify eligible candidates for federal benefits before turning over forms to law firm).
91. See id. (stating additionally that registration forms were reviewed by law
firm parmer and his legal assistant, whereupon forms of ineligible patients were
placed in storage).
92. See id. (noting testimony of legal assistant).
93. See id. at 521 (stating that class action law suit was brought by two patients
on behalf of all patients whose registration forms were released by the hospital).
The plaintiffs sued under traditional theories of recovery, not the independent
tort ultimately defined by the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. (noting that plaintiffs'
claims on traditional theories derived from premise that hospital's agreement with
law firm was breach of their confidentiality). Many courts uphold claims for
breach of patient confidentiality, but ground the claim in a traditional tort recovery theory such as breach of implied contract or breach of a fiduciary trust. See,
e.g.,
Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-03 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (applying Ohio law and upholding patient cause of action against insurance
company for inducing breach of physician disclosure on both contractual and fiduciary grounds); Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830-32 (Ala. 1974) (preserving
patient suit against doctor and noting that either privacy, contract or fiduciary
theories can ground claim). See generally Gilles, supra note 4, at 4-62 (discussing
court decisions upholding patient confidentiality claims on theories of invasion of
privacy, breach of contract or fiduciary trust or breach of confidence).
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ment for the defendants on all claims. 9 4 Although agreeing with the trial
court's determination that the patients' alleged claims were nonviable, the
appeals court reversed the decision, basing a viable cause of action by the
patients on a breach of a physician-patient confidence. 9 5 The appeals
court rejected the defendants' argument that because the law firm owed a
duty of confidentiality to its hospital client, the patients' confidences, held
by the hospital, transitively remained protected. 9 6 On review, the Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed and expounded on the basis and contours of the
97
newly established cause of action.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Biddle first determined that state precedent clearly permitted a physician or hospital to be held liable for extrajudicial disclosure of confidential patient information. 98 The court was
reluctant, however, to recognize the cause of action under traditional theories of recovery because they "prove [d] ill-suited for the purpose, and
their application contrived, as... designed to protect diverse interests that
only coincidentally overlap that of preserving patient confidentiality." 99
Recognizing that a disclosure tort based on breach of confidence was the
natural evolution of an appropriate remedy, the Biddle court established
an independent tort.100 The tort permitted a patient claim for the "unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical
information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physicianpatient relationship." 0 1 This Note will refer to Biddle's formulation as a
"physician disclosure tort."
94. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 521 (noting that trial court denied patients' motion for class certification as moot upon dismissal of claims for breach of
confidentiality).
95. See id. at 521-22 (noting appeals court reversal). The appeals court's decision established an independent tort, but its formulation was too generalized for
the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. at 521 (stating that appeals court tort definition
as "an unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a confidential relationship").
96. See id. at 521-22 (stating appeals court rationale that duty of confidentiality
applies to disclosure to any third party, including law firm, and that consent from
patients was necessary for hospital action).
97. See id. at 522-29 (tailoring tort definition to physician-patient
relationship).
98. See id. at 522 (citing Ohio precedent that physicians have been and should
continue to be disciplined for unauthorized, extra-judicial disclosures of their patients' private medical information). The court cited both federal cases interpreting Ohio law and state lower court cases to underscore that the attachment of
liability for breaches of patient confidentiality, albeit under traditional recovery
theories, is not a novel concept. See id. (identifying clear basis for holding physicians liable).
99. Id. at 523. The court also characterized the application of traditional recovery theories to physician disclosure claims as "trying to fit a round peg into a
square hole." Id.
100. See id. (highlighting decisions of courts in various United States jurisdictions which have recognized to some degree breach of confidence tort).
101. Id. The court delineated the tort's limitations clearly in this definition.
See id. (defining tort). "Unauthorized" indicates that patients can waive their rights
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The court in Biddle was careful to recognize that where a physician's
statutory or common-law duty mandated or permitted disclosure, liability
would not attach. 10 2 The court intimated that, in Ohio, a health care provider has a limited legal justification to disclose information "necessary to
collect [a] debt"; however, the hospital's disclosure of every patient's registration form without screening clearly violated this standard.10 3 Alternatively, patient consent would act as a waiver of the duty of confidentiality,
but the court held that the general release form signed by patients allowing disclosure "for completion of ... hospitalization claims" did not
authorize disclosure to the hospital's attorneys for application of federal
104
benefits.
Echoing the result in Hammonds, the Biddle court also upheld the
plaintiffs' claim that the law firm knowingly induced the hospital to breach
its duty of confidentiality to its patients.10 5 Underscoring the importance
to confidentiality, provided that the release form specifies who will be receiving the
information. See id. at 527-28 (citing Mrozinski v. Pogue, 423 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1992),
which interpreted Georgia statute authorizing psychiatrists to release clinical
records to patient's attorney with patient consent as not authorizing release to
patient's mother's attorney). "Unprivileged" recognizes that a physician has statutory and common law duties that legally justify disclosure without a patient's consent, and that a physician should not be caught in the dilemma where a decision
between violating state law or being subject to patient tort claims is required. See
id. at 524 ("[T]he physician would be placed in the untenable position ... [of]
breaching one of two opposing common-law duties."). "Nonpublic" underscores
that if information obtained from a patient is already public knowledge, a physician will not be liable for disclosing it to a third party. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. b (1977) (interpreting publicity requirement for "private
facts" branch of invasion of privacy tort as immunizing defendant from liability if
facts are public record). For the complete text of the Restatement's definition of
the invasion of privacy tort, see supra note 39. "Medical" information is not as
clearly defined because health records can contain demographic and financial information; notes regarding sexual history, lifestyle choices, and family status;
records of perpetrating or being victimized by sexual or violent crimes; as well as
information describing disease histories, medical treatments, and drug or alcohol
dependencies. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 489-90 (describing sensitive nature of
health records); see also id. at 491 (noting that individual's genetic code can reveal
medical information about biological ancestors, descendants and siblings).
102. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524 (stating that statutory mandates to report
occupational or infectious diseases, indications of child abuse and injuries suggesting criminal activity, as well as common law duties to disclose to protect safety
of third persons, immunize physician from liability).
103. See id. at 527 (rejecting defendants' argument that hospital's disclosure
of patient registration forms was legally justified as debt collection effort). Not
only did the court imply that review of all patient forms regardless of owing debt
exceeded that which would be necessary to collect, the court also indicated that
the agreement between the hospital and law firm was not the type of debt collection contemplated by those courts permitting a qualified legal justification for such
a purpose. See id. at 527 n.1 (characterizing hospital action as egregious in
circumstances).
104. See id. at 527 (discussing ineffectiveness of general release signed by patients for authorization to disclose beyond insurance company or third party
payer).
105. See id. at 528 (defining requirements for third party liability).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss1/4

18

Frankel: Do Doctors Have a Constitutional Right to Violate Their Patient's

2001]

NOTE

159

of protecting patient privacy, the court stated that a third party's need for
private patient medical information may sometimes give rise to a legal justification to disclose, but it is strictly limited to disclosure to individuals
10 6
with a "legitimate interest" in a patient's health and medical treatment.
The law firm may have been acting in its own interest or in the hospital's
interest by attempting to obtain federal benefits for unpaid medical expenses; however, the patients' health or medical treatment was not an im10 7
plicated concern.
Although Ohio's new tort is an important step toward addressing a
serious harm, it punishes physicians for their communication to third parties.108 Because the tort deters a category of speech, this positive step risks
10 9
As a
erasure unless it can prevail against a First Amendment challenge.

remedy narrowly circumscribed by the Ohio Supreme Court to the physician-patient circumstance, the tort will likely avoid the First Amendment
0
hurdles believed to plague the broader tort of breach of confidence."1

To establish liability the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known of the existence of the physician-patient
relationship; (2) the defendant intended to induce the physician to disclose information about the patient or the defendant reasonably should
have anticipated that his actions would induce the physician to disclose
such information; and (3) the defendant did not reasonably believe that
the physician could disclose that information to the defendant without
violating the duty of confidentiality that the physician owed the patient.
Id. (quoting Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Mass. 1985)). The dissent in
Biddle felt that the issue did not concern patient confidentiality, but rather the
hospital's need to function through its agents. See id. at 531-32 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that even if breach of confidentiality is assumed,
cursory review of registration form and contact by law firm regarding federal benefits creates negligible patient trauma).
106. See id. at 528 (limiting legal justification for disclosure to third parties).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Cook noted that the court's decision did not attach liability for disclosure for risk management and quality assurance activities
engaged in by health care providers. See id. at 529 (Cook, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority's creation of new tort and characterizing it as "appropriately narrow"). A legitimate interest in a patient's health is a stricter requirement than the
"real need to know" standard suggested as the legal boundary of a justified disclosure in Levias. See Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985) (attempting to limit scope of legal justification of physician disclosure).
107. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 528 (agreeing with defendants that attorney
needed patients' information to determine federal program eligibility, but rejecting argument equating attorney need with patients' health interest).
108. For a discussion of the specific circumstances under which a physician is
punished under the new Ohio tort, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
109. SeeJurata, supra note 39, at 498 (arguing that any cause of action which
has potential to restrict speech will "inevitabl[y] . . . clash with the First
Amendment").
110. See generally Gilles, supra note 4, at 80-84 (arguing that breach of confidence torts are too broad and chill too much speech to survive First Amendment
scrutiny).
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The Biddle court, however, did not address the implications of the new tort
11
under the First Amendment in its opinion. 1
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO A PHYSICIAN DISCLOSURE TORT

The United States has a long history of protecting an individual's
right to speak under the First Amendment, even when another individual
is injured by that speech. 112 Allowances have been made, however, for the
redress of particular injuries incurred by conduct in the form of
speech.' 13 When a state enforces laws that are content-neutral though incidentally infringing on speech, those laws are subject to an intermediate
level of scrutiny under the First Amendment.1 14 Because judiciary enforcement of common law torts is considered state action, a state-defined
tort deterring conduct must be content-neutral to be subject to intermedi111. See generally Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999)
(creating tort but not discussing its First Amendment implications).
112. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (permitting flag
burning demonstration on "bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment
... that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"); BJ.F. v. Florida Star, 491
U.S. 524, 536, 541 (1989) (dismissing claim against newspaper by rape victim
whose name was published after having been lawfully obtained); Cox Broad. Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (dismissing invasion of privacy claim against
television news station for publication of plaintiff's daughter's name as homicide
and rape victim on grounds that information was already public as contained in

court documents).
113. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (find-

ing claim for breach of confidence against newspaper for publishing name of
source valid on principle that media is subject to generally applicable laws of contract); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980) (upholding breach of confidentiality claim by CIA against former employee on "national security" grounds);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (reviewing racist speech against
"principle that the... [First Amendment] ... do[es] not permit a State to forbid
...advocacy of the use of force . . . except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce

such action"); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 43-44 (Cal. 1971) (upholding invasion of privacy claim against newspaper for publishing plaintiff's name
in article about crime because plaintiffs offense was eleven years old and therefore
no longer newsworthy).
114. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669 (applying intermediate scrutiny and holding
that incidental effects on speech through enforcement of laws of general applicability "do not offend the First Amendment"). The United States Supreme Court
has applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold laws that affirmatively compel conduct
on a private party which incidentally effects that party's right not to speak. See, e.g.,
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641, 667-68 (1994) (upholding
"must-carry" provisions of Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992,
which mandated that cable operators carry local broadcast stations). The Court in
Turner stated that the interests served by the "must-carry" provisions-"(1) preserving the benefits of free over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3)
promoting fair competition in the market for television programming"-were not
related to "the suppression of free expression." Turner, 512 U.S. at 662.
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161

ate scrutiny under a constitutional challenge.1 15 If a common law tort is
not content-neutral, the state action is presumed unconstitutional and is
1 16
subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Patient remedies for unauthorized medical record disclosure predicated on breach of contract or fiduciary duty result from a state's enforcement of content-neutral laws. 11 7 Despite the tort's infringement on a
physician's right to communicate, they are generally applicable and therefore constitutional. 118 Ohio's physician disclosure tort impacts physicians'
freedom to communicate confidential facts about their patients."l 9 If this
tort that punishes physician conduct is construed as a content-neutral state
120
If
action, the tort will avoid strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.
the tort is held to implicate speech directly, constitutionality becomes con121
tingent on surviving strict scrutiny.
A.

PhysicianDisclosure Tort as Content-Neutral State Action

In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 122 the United States Supreme Court set
1 23
the criteria for evaluating whether a state action is content-neutral.
The defendant newspaper had promised its source, a political campaign
worker, that in exchange for information about the opposing candidate,
his name would not be revealed.' 24 After the source conveyed the infor12 5
Almation, the newspaper broke its promise and printed his name.
115. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (establishing
long-standing principle that enforcement in state courts of state laws that infringe
on speech constitute state action requiring analysis under First Amendment
doctrine).
116. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) ("In the
context of governmental restriction of speech, it has long been established that the
government cannot limit speech protected by the First Amendment without bearing the burden of showing that its restriction is justified.").
117. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 64 (discussing contract and fiduciary laws as
being generally applicable).
118. See id. at 63-65 (discussing likely avoidance of First Amendment challenge by breach of confidence actions brought under contract or fiduciary duty
theories of recovery).
119. See id. at 73 (noting that unlike contract-based and fiduciary duty-based
actions, independent breach of confidence tort punishes communication and not
"breach" of promise or duty).
120. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991) (stating that
content-neutral state action has "constitutionally insignificant" impact).
121. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 777 (requiring governmental justification for laws
infringing on speech in order to survive constitutional challenge).
122. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
123. See generally id., 501 U.S. 663 (upholding breach of confidence claim as
neutral state action); see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980) (upholding breach of confidence claim).
124. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665-66 (noting that plaintiff had provided information about opposing candidate to two separate newspapers in exchange for anonymity, and both independently chose to print his name regardless).
125. See id. at 666 (stating repercussion from newspaper article was immediate
dismissal by employer).
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though the newspaper was being punished for publishing true
information, the Court held that the action did not violate the newspaper's First Amendment rights because an action for breach of contract is a
generally applicable law and therefore neutral in regard to speech.1 26 Cohen declares that a content-neutral law cannot (1) target the press, (2)
1 27
target the message embodied in speech, or (3) target speech itself
The physician disclosure tort established in Biddle is arguably contentneutral. 1 28 First, the tort aims to circumscribe the conduct of health care
providers, not the press. 129 Second, although physicians learn about a patient's bodily condition for the purpose of providing medical care, the
duty of confidentiality extends to whatever subject matter is necessarily
acquired by the physician to advance that purpose. 130 Therefore, a physician disclosure tort does not target any particular message.1 31 Whether
the tort violates the third criterion, targeting speech itself, requires a
1 32
closer examination of how speech can be distinguished from conduct.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
133
content-neutral laws that prohibit conduct which overlaps with speech.
The Court has also invalidated laws targeting expressive conduct, finding
that their purpose was to infringe the speech represented by the conduct

126. See id. at 669-72 (highlighting that press, in effort to publish story, is not
immune from generally applicable laws protecting against copyright infringement,
discrimination, anti-trust violations and criminal violence).
127. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 70 (synthesizing Cohen ruling into criteria for
content-neutral determination).
128. For a discussion of the content-neutrality of the physician disclosure tort
created in Biddle, see infra notes 129-51 and accompanying text.
129. See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (circumscribing conduct of "physician[s] or hospital[s]" in its definition of physician
disclosure tort).
130. For a discussion of the wide variety of information which is exchanged in
the context of a physician-patient relationship, see supranote 101 and accompanying text.
131. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989) (upholding city ordinance mandating use of city's amplification equipment at concerts
because purpose of ordinance was to ensure maximum decibel level, not to dissuade certain bands from playing). The Court in Ward stated that "[a] regulation
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not on others."
Id. at 791 (stating rule for content-neutral determination).
132. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (establishing
rule for determining whether state action targets expression in conduct and therefore requires strict scrutiny under First Amendment).
133. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282 (2000) (upholding
city's ordinance ban on public nudity despite its incidental and minimal effect on
dancers' ability to convey erotic message in striptease establishment); O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 386 (upholding defendant's conviction for burning draft card in protest of
Vietnam War).
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they restricted. 13 4 In United States v. O'Brien,135 the Court upheld the conviction of a defendant who burned his draft card to protest the draft and
the Vietnam War.1 36 The Court, applying intermediate scrutiny, stated

that laws serving a substantial government interest unrelated to suppressing speech, but which incidentally restrict speech, are constitutional. 137 The governmental interest upheld in O'Brien was the efficient
operation of the Selective Service System, in spite of the law's incidental
138
prohibition on a particular form of symbolic expression.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in Anderson v. FisherBroadcastingCos., 1 39
cast the distinction based on the nature of the conduct itself as opposed to
the interest served by the law prohibiting it. 14 0 The court dismissed the
plaintiffs claim for emotional distress resulting from a news station's
broadcast of his auto accident trauma because the publication of truthful
facts was not wrongful beyond the broadcast itself.' 4 1 The court held,
however, that tort liability would attach if the purpose or manner of the
injurious conduct were wrongful apart from creating hurt feelings-such
142
as when a defendant disregards a duty of confidentiality.
134. See, e.g., Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399-400 (1989) (reversing defendant's conviction for burning American flag under state law banning desecration
of venerated object on grounds that defendant's expressive conduct was protected
by First Amendment); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315-18 (1988) (striking down
District of Columbia law prohibiting display of signs denigrating foreign government within 500 feet of that government's embassy on grounds that law was targeting content of expression inherent in conduct). "[T] hat the government may not
prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message ... is not dependent on the particular mode in which one chooses to express an idea." Johnson,
491 U.S. at 416.
135. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
136. See id. at 386 (finding federal law prohibiting destruction of draft cards
constitutional).
137. See id. at 376-77 (setting forth guidelines for evaluating whether governmental interest furthered by law justifies restriction of First Amendment rights to
free expression). The Court established the following test for considering a law's
constitutionality:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
138. See id. at 377-81 (describing function and purpose of draft cards as being
substantial and legitimate aid to effective functioning of Selective Service System).
139. 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986).
140. See generally id. (examining defendant's conduct independently from
state's interest in punishing behavior through judicial endorsement of tort).
141. See id. at 814 (noting that plaintiffs claim was only for emotional distress
damages, not for unpaid endorsement value of broadcast).
142. See id. (outlining circumstances which would sustain claim for emotional
distress resulting from "presentation of facts concerning a person"). The court
provided examples that could meet its wrongful conduct standard, including publishing in a socially intolerable manner, obtaining the information wrongfully, or
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Whether examined according to the governmental interest served by
the state action under O'Brien or according to the wrongfulness of the conduct under Anderson, the physician disclosure tort created in Biddle can be
construed as not targeting speech. 143 The Biddle court stated that the
tort's purpose was the preservation of patient confidentiality.1

44

Courts

invariably recognize that an assurance of confidentiality between physician
and patient is necessary to provide adequate medical treatment-a substantial governmental interest distinct from restricting physicians'
speech. 145 Underscoring this distinction are the numerous regulations
that exist to maintain a high quality health care system which do not infringe on speech.1

46

The unauthorized disclosure itself has been described by a chorus of
courts as "so palpable a wrong" that a remedy is justified. 147 It violates
professional ethics codes and has been the basis of plaintiff recovery, albeit inadequate, on other legal theories.1 48 A breach of this duty of confidentiality, exemplified in Anderson as conduct wrongful enough to sustain
a claim for emotional distress resulting from speech, is the same wrong
14 9
punished by Biddle's physician disclosure tort.
As state action targeting health care providers and punishing conduct
that is inherently wrongful, a physician disclosure tort should avoid strict
First Amendment scrutiny and be found constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.' 50 If the tort fails Cohen's test as state action targeting speech,
then its infringement on physician expression will be subject to strict
5
scrutiny.1 1
breaching confidentiality or another statutory duty. See id. (outlining "wrongful
conduct" holding).
143. For a discussion of how the physician disclosure tort in Biddle is contentneutral under O'Brien or Anderson, see infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
144. See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999)
("[T] o support liability, a more appropriate basis can be found in the nature of the
physician-patient relationship itself ... because it is customarily understood to
carry an obligation of secrecy and confidence.").
145. For examples of courts recognizing importance of free sharing of information by patient with physician, see supra note 23.
146. See, e.g., Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300gg-4 , 300gg-51) (prohibiting restrictions on hospital stay reimbursements
for women after vaginal birth of less than forty-eight hours after delivery, to ensure
adequate care for mothers).
147. For a list of courts declaring unauthorized physician disclosures "so palpable a wrong," see supra note 61.
148. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 523 (discussing reasons relied on by courts to
uphold physician liability, though commenting on inadequacies of traditional theories in providing appropriate remedies for patients).
149. See Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 814 (Or. 1986) (listing
types of conduct so wrongful apart from speech that liability properly attaches).
150. For a discussion of how the physician disclosure tort in Biddle can be
found content-neutral, see supra notes 128-49 and accompanying text.
151. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 69-70 (describing satisfaction of Cohen criteria
as necessary to avoid strict scrutiny under First Amendment).
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PhysicianDisclosure Tort Under FirstAmendment Strict Scrutiny

52
The United States Supreme Court's decision in B.JF. v. FloridaStar
153
applied the strict scrutiny standard to a state law that targeted the press.
The plaintiff in Florida Star was a rape victim, whose name was inadvertently included in a police press report, and then subsequently published
in the defendant's newspaper. 15 4 The plaintiff sued the newspaper for
negligence in violating Florida's law banning the publication of sex crime
victims' names.1 5 5 The plaintiff won at trial, but her award of compensatory and punitive damages was overturned by the United States Supreme
Court.156
The Court carefully noted that the constitutionality of state actions
under the First Amendment are decided on a case-by-case basis, and that it
was willing to uphold a state law infringing on publication of lawfully obtained true speech only upon a showing by the state that the law furthered
an "interest of the highest order."1 5 7 The Court did not believe that Florida's publication ban met this standard, despite its clear purpose in protecting the privacy of rape victims and promoting their coming forward to
58
report crimes.'

152. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
153. See generally id. at 524 (applying strict scrutiny analysis to newspaper's
publication of rape victim's name in violation of Florida law). The strict scrutiny
rule was formulated in a previous case, Smith v. Daily Mail PublishingCo., where the
court stated: "[I] f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order." Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))
(alteration in original).
154. See id. at 527-28. A reporter-trainee from the defendant newspaper had
copied a police press release, including the victim's full name, verbatim, into a
"Police Reports" story. See id. at 527. Further, the publication of the rape victim's
name was contrary to the newspaper's internal policy. See id. at 528.
155. See id. (stating procedural history). At trial, the plaintiff won a directed
verdict finding the newspaper per se negligent in violation of the Florida statute
banning publication of rape victims' names. See id. at 529 (summarizing lower
court procedure).
156. See id. at 532 (overturning lower court's award of damages to plaintiff
because Florida could not justify law under strict scrutiny analysis).
157. See id. at 530 ("Our decisions ... involving government attempts to [impede] the accurate dissemination of information .

.

. have not .

.

. exhaustively

considered this conflict. On the contrary... each time.., we were resolving this
conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context."); see a/soJurata, supra note 39,
at 501 (noting Court's refusal in Florida Star to hold that publication of truthful
information can never be punished without violating First Amendment).
158. See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 538-40 (discussing reasons why Florida law did
not meet strict scrutiny standard). The Court did not say that the protection of
rape victims from their assailants and governmental encouragement to come forward were not significant interests. See id. at 537 (stating rationale for decision).
On the contrary, the Court recognized the importance of these goals. See id. ("[I] t
is undeniable that these are highly significant interests."). Florida's law furthering
these interests, however, was unconstitutional because it singled out "instruments
of mass communication" and because Florida failed to employ less drastic means
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In his Florida Star dissent, Justice White suggested that if the protection of rape victims' names was not a state interest of the highest order,
the Court's decision had "obliterate [d] .

.

. the tort of publication of pri-

vate facts."15 9 Some commentators have seized upon Justice White's statement to declare that the Court will never permit punishment targeted at
true speech.' 60 Other commentators point to the Court's refusal to find
any law infringing on true speech unconstitutional per se as hope that an
appropriately formulated law or common law tort can meet the Court's
standard.' 61 There are two bases upon which a physician disclosure tort
directly implicating speech can survive strict. scrutiny under Florida Star
first, a showing that protection of confidentiality in the physician-patient
relationship is a "state interest of the highest order," or, second, by distin162
guishing Florida Star as a press-specific doctrine.
Courts unanimously recognize how critical patient confidentiality is to
receiving medical treatment. 163 Courts also recognize a physician's duty
to maintain patient confidentiality when testifying in judicial proceedings.' 6 4 The privacy interest in the intimate details of a patient's medical
treatment arguably exceeds a rape victim's privacy interest in maintaining
anonymity. 165 Patient confidentiality being paramount to quality health
care, combined with the Court's willingness to consider a viable candidate

than punishing true speech to achieve these ends. See id. at 538-40 (noting lack of
evenhanded application of ban on publication of rape victims' names).
159. Id. at 550. Because the B.J.F. brought her cause of action alleging negli-

gence, not invasion of privacy, Justice White's comment regarding the status of the
private facts branch of the invasion of privacy tort may have overstated the effect of
the Court's ruling. See id. at 528 (stating facts).
160. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 74-75 (characterizing FloridaStartest as "impossibly strict" such that "a tortious action for breach of confidence faces either automatic unconstitutionality or a scrutiny so strict that no plaintiff can recover").
161. See Harvey, supra note 18, at 2463-64 (distinguishing Court's Florida Star
invasion of privacy ruling from its breach of confidence ruling in Cohen, characterizing Court's problem with Florida's law as state targeting of speech content);
Jurata, supra note 39, at 510, 525-26 (arguing that judicial willingness to uphold
private facts claims to protect confidential medical information may stem from
claims' focus on non-media defendants).
162. See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 533 (stating that heightened scrutiny standard
for punishment of "newspapers" requires "state interest of the highest order").
163. For judicial statements regarding the importance of confidentiality in
the physician-patient relationship, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 804-05
(N.D. Ohio 1965) (discussing circumstances under which patient's testimonial
privilege to prevent physician from disclosing confidential information has been
waived).
165. SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (upholding a psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege, stating that "mental health of our citizenry, no less
than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance" (emphasis
added)).
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for "highest order" state interest, creates an opportunity for the narrowly
166
tailored tort in Biddle to survive strict scrutiny.
Alternatively, Florida Star can be distinguished.1 6 7 The Court's decision followed a line of cases involving press defendants. 1 68 Its holding
requiring a "state interest of the highest order" to uphold a state action
infringing speech specifically applied only to "newspapers" publishing
"matter[ s] of public significance." 169 The tort created by Biddle focuses on
the disclosure by a health care provider to a third party and protects information that, for the average patient, is not of public significance. 170 The
Court's ruling in Florida Star was premised on a concern that the chilling
effect of punishing the publication of true facts would result in "timidity
and self-censorship." 17 1 The Biddle tort recognizes that liability does not
attach for legally justified disclosures. 172 Without legal justification or
consent to disclose, physician self-censorship is in the best interest of the
patient.

173

V.

CONCLUSION

Patient privacy is an issue of serious public concern today. 174 This

concern has culminated in regulations under HIPAA that increase requirements imposed on health care providers to protect patient confiden166. See Jurata, supra note 39, at 525 (arguing that upholding claims for
breaches of patient confidentiality is an emerging trend in American courts).
167. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 18, at 2463-64 (distinguishing Court's strict
rulings against punishing publication of private facts as protecting publishers as
opposed to protecting other sources of information, such as physicians).
168. See B.F.J. v. Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1989) (noting preceding
cases informing decision). The Court cited cases involving a television station and
two newspapers that were sued for publishing private facts, where in each case the
state action was found unconstitutional. See id. (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), Okla. Publ'g v. Okla. County Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977), and
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)).
169. Id. at 533.
170. See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (defining tort); see also Harvey, supra note 18, at 2463 (arguing that breach of confidence actions target protector of confidential information as opposed to media).
171. See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 535 (noting negative effect which would result
from permitting media defendants to be held liable for publishing true
information).
172. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524 (recognizing that physicians are legallyjustified in disclosing confidential information, without being subject to liability, if they
have statutory or common law duty to do so).
173. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 490-91 ("Patients are less likely to divulge
sensitive information to health professionals if they are not assured that their confidences will be respected.").
174. See Barefoot, supra note 1, at 283 ("Americans are worried about their
privacy. Surveys consistently indicate widespread concern about access to and use
of personal information by others, with the privacy of health-related information
the object of particular concern." (footnotes omitted)); Schwartz, supra note 1, at
296 ("Americans are highly concerned about the processing and use of their personal data.").
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tiality. 175 Notably absent from these regulations, however, is a private
right of action for patients harmed by unauthorized disclosures of their
private medical information. 176 Biddle's physician disclosure tort fills this
regulatory gap, complementing its prophylactic privacy protection with a
deterrent in the form of a direct remedy for patients.' 77 As the tort
evolves, compliance with the federal regulations may influence a health
178
care provider's liability when unauthorized disclosures occur.
In Biddle, Ohio has taken a positive step towards improving patients'
ability to rely on their doctors' assurances of confidentiality. 179 By establishing an independent physician disclosure tort, the Ohio Supreme Court
has freed an important cause of action from its historical chains, permitting the boundaries of the remedy to be explored and shaped by future
cases.18 The Biddle decision has already influenced other jurisdictions by
encouraging a second look at their common law tort remedies for patients
harmed by physician disclosure.' 8 ' Should it be challenged on First
Amendment grounds, the tort should prevail as a content-neutral state ac175. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
64 Fed. Reg. 59,918 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160)
(imposing regulations on health care providers, requiring implementation of programs and procedures to restrict access to health records and to account for
disclosures).
176. See id. at 59,923 (stating authors' concern that regulations do not provide
private right of action for patients harmed by violations).
177. For a brief discussion of the scope of the regulations promulgated by the
HHS under HIPAA, see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
178. Cf. Barnum v. Williams, 504 P.2d 122, 126 (Or. 1972) (recognizing
emerging rule that violation of statute, absent defendant producing sufficient evidence of reasonable conduct notwithstanding violation, permits question of defendant's negligence to be submitted to jury).
179. See generally Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp. 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio
1999) (creating independent tort for unauthorized disclosure by physician or hospital of confidential patient information).
180. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 58 (suggesting two reasons for creating direct
breach of confidence tort: (1) damages are measured differently for tort than for
contract or fiduciary breach, and (2) courts' "desire to escape formalities of contract and fiduciary law"); see also Vickery, supra note 34, at 1451 (discussing advantage of judge-made breach of confidence tort over legislated one in its ability to
adapt and evolve as litigants present unique fact patterns). For a broader discussion of the limitations of contract and fiduciary law as applied to actions for breach
of patient confidence, see supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
181. See Berger v. Sonneland, 1 P.3d 1187, 1196 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding patient cause of action under statutory provision permitting claims for
healthcare-related injuries and citing Biddle in recognition that although physician
disclosure tort is analogous to invasion of privacy tort in that recoverable emotional distress need not be accompanied by objective symptoms, privacy tort does
not really fit breach of confidence actions); Gracey v. Eaker, 747 So. 2d 475, 477-78
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Biddle as persuasive in its certification of question
"of great public importance" to state supreme court as to whether requirement of
accompanying physical injury for any claim of emotional distress should be waived
for actions where statutory duty to protect patient confidentiality has been
violated).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss1/4

28

Frankel: Do Doctors Have a Constitutional Right to Violate Their Patient's

2001]

NomE

169

tion. 18 2 As other jurisdictions see fit to take similar steps, the remedy will
183
enjoy a proper outline of its contours through civil jurisprudence.
Michael Frankel

182. For a discussion of the reasons why the physician disclosure tort in Biddle
should be construed as content-neutral, see supra notes 122-50 and accompanying
text.
183. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 58 (suggesting two reasons for creating a direct
breach of confidence tort: (1) damages are measured differently for tort than for
contract or fiduciary breach, and (2) courts' "desire to escape formalities of contract and fiduciary law"); see also Vickery, supra note 34, at 1451 (discussing advantage of judge-made breach of confidence tort over legislated one in its ability to
adapt and evolve as litigants present unique fact patterns).
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